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Obligations and Penalties under Lemon Laws:
Automobiles versus Tractors
Terence J. Centner and Michael E. Wetzstein
Distinctive new provisions of tractor lemon laws which create obligations and provide
penalties for defective self-propelled agricultural equipment are contrasted with provisions
of automobile lemon laws. Lemon-law obligations involve both producers' guarantees to
provide consumers with a serviceable vehicle and producers' promises to remedy defects.
Due to fewer manufacturer obligations under the tractor lemon laws as opposed to automobile lemon laws, tractors may be expected to have more defects than automobiles. Yet the
tractor lemon laws contain fewer penalties in the form of restitution remedies. The
inconsistences of these obligations and penalties suggest tractor laws may be inefficient.
Key words: lemon laws, obligation, penalty, precaution, principal-agent, warranty

Introduction
Consumer dissatisfaction with the consumer remedies provided by state commercial laws
and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act relating to defective products' led to the
enactment of state lemon laws in the 1980s (Greenberg; LaManna; Samuels, Coffinberger,

and McCrohan; Vogel). Many of the earlier consumer remedies for defective products are
based on a breach of an express or implied warranty 2 and involve the replacement of
defective items, the repair of the product during a specified warranty period, or the refund
of the purchase price (Chapman and Meurer). For some defective products, sellers are liable
for incidental and consequential damages incurred as a result of the defect (Uniform
Commercial Code). Lemon laws were designed to augment these remedies and require
producer-manufacturers to repair defective products, fulfill product guarantees, and take

back defective vehicles or refund the purchase price. Lemon laws also ease consumers'
burden of proof of defects (Norman; Vogel), encourage resolution of disputes without a trial
(Adams; Dahringer and Johnson; Kegley and Hiller; Nicks), and simplify refunds for
defective products (Adams; LaManna). Although lemon laws are best known for their
warranty coverage of new automobiles, new and expanded provisions also cover used
The authors are professors in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens.
This research was supported by a Hatch grant from the College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, The University
of Georgia.
As used in this article, defective products include products with defects as well as products that do not meet the guarantees
of applicable warranties.
2
State warranty provisions generally are analogous because they were adopted from a Uniform Commercial Code. An
affirmation of a product's quality constitutes an express warranty (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313). For merchants, an
implied warranty of merchantability accompanies the sale of a product unless excluded or modified and requires goods to pass
without objection in the trade; be fit for ordinary purposes; be of even kind and quality; be adequately contained, packaged,
and labeled; and conform with promises made on the label or container (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314). A warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose exists if, at the time of contracting, the buyer requested goods for a particular purpose, the seller
knew that the buyer needs the goods for a particular purpose, and the seller knew that the buyer was relying on the seller's skill
or judgment to furnish suitable goods (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315).
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automobiles, leased automobiles (Adams; Greenberg), and tractors (Centner). 3 The state
lemon laws may be grouped in two major categories, one for automobiles and one for
tractors.
Probability of product defects creates market imperfections resulting from the uncertainty of defects, limited information by consumers concerning the distribution of product
defects, moral hazard, and negative externalities such as medical expenses and property
damage accompanying product defects. These market imperfections prevent a Coasian
solution (Coase). Thus, lemon laws were established providing warranties to increase
product quality, augment remedies for a defect, and diminish the probability that a consumer
will receive a defective product (Cooper and Ross; Grossman; Priest). Smithson and Thomas
concluded that consumers place a relatively small value on lemon-law protection because
consumers do not believe it is likely they will end up with a lemon vehicle. 4 An expected
result of this consumer perception is insufficient consumer demand for product reliability.
The low consumer demand and market imperfections provide a basis for governmental
market intervention in the form of lemon laws with remedies for defective vehicles.
The issue addressed in this article concerns an optimal level of obligations and penalties
regarding defective vehicles as a policy instrument for improving market performance. An
economic efficiency model of warranties based on a principal-agent model is developed with
the state as the principal and the producer-manufacturer as the agent. Distinctions among
obligations and penalties of the automobile and tractor lemon laws are investigated to show
the effects of warranty laws on producers' incentives for providing conforming products.
Conforming products mean products with defects as well as products that do not meet the
guarantees of applicable warranties. The analysis demonstrates that as the obligations of
producers are weakened through more rigorous qualifications for a defect, penalties in the
form of consumer remedies associated with a defect should increase. However, the provisions of the automobile and tractor lemon laws do not agree with this model. The tractor
lemon laws contain fewer obligations due to more rigorous qualifications for a defect, yet
also specify fewer penalties than the automobile lemon laws. This inconsistency suggests
that the tractor lemon laws may be inefficient.
General Distinctions between Lemon Laws
The laws of the four states (Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia) that have both
automobile and tractor lemon laws reveal two distinctive categories concerning consumer
rights and defective vehicles (Georgia Code Annotated; Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated; Minnesota Statutes Annotated; Virginia Code Annotated). The first distinction is that
the laws contain dissimilar prerequisites that curtail lemon-law obligations. The second
distinction is that the laws contain dissimilar penalties regarding restitution remedies.
PrerequisitesCurtailingObligations
Lemon-law obligations involve both producers' guarantees to provide consumers with a

serviceable vehicle and producers' promises to remedy defects. Tractor lemon laws incorporate four prerequisites that are not present in the automobile laws to curtail obligations.
3

Tractors include other self-propelled agricultural equipment such as combines.
Legislative passage of lemon laws may be part of an effort for legislators to look good in the eyes of their constituents. Such
posturing may be unrelated to the value of the benefits bestowed by the lemon laws (Smithson and Thomas).
4
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Fewer obligations signify less producer precaution and more defective vehicles in the
marketplace.
An initial prerequisite curtailing obligations is the definition of vehicles. The tractor laws
only cover new vehicles whereas many of the automobile laws also cover leased, demonstrator, and reconveyed vehicles. For example, under the tractor lemon laws a manufacturer
could resell a returned lemon tractor without full disclosure of its previous problems. In
contrast, full disclosure is required to subsequent purchasers under many automobile lemon
laws.
A second prerequisite curtails obligations by limiting penalties to a narrow class of
warranties. Tractor laws cover defects of items guaranteed by the producer in writing,
whereas consumers' recovery under the automobile lemon laws generally may be based on
an oral warranty, and in some cases, on an implied warranty. This prerequisite reduces the
guarantees made by tractor producers with a concomitant reduction of situations whereby
consumers of tractors may qualify for restitution.
The lemon-law definition of a defect also curtails obligations. Three tests may be used
to classify an automobile as defective: the vehicle is unreliable, the vehicle is unsafe, or the
vehicle has a diminished resale value. In contrast, tractor lemon laws in Georgia, Minnesota,
and Virginia require the replacement of a lemon vehicle or refund of the purchase price only
if the defect substantially impairs both use and market value. Thus, if a consumer bought a
tractor and an automobile, each with a safety problem that did not substantially impair the
vehicle's use or market value, the consumer would qualify for a refund for the defective
automobile but not for the defective tractor. Similarly, the purchaser of a tractor with a defect
other than a safety problem that substantially impairs only its use or market value, but not
both, may not qualify for lemon-law relief.
A fourth prerequisite involves aggregations of different defects to calculate an out-ofservice period. All automobile and tractor lemon laws stipulate that if the vehicle is out of
service due to repairs for more than a specific number of days, the consumer is entitled to a
replacement vehicle or a refund. Automobile lemon laws allow adding out-of-service times
from different defects. The tractor lemon laws require the same defect to preclude usage of
the vehicle for more than the prescribed period before a consumer may qualify for a refund
or replacement.
Remedies That Serve As Penalties

Restitution remedies suggest that the automobile lemon laws provide consumers greater
relief than the tractor laws. Under the automobile lemon laws, a consumer who is entitled
to a replacement or refund is entitled to be reimbursed for collateral and incidental costs.
These costs include sales taxes, financing charges, towing charges, and costs of obtaining
alternative transportation, but a reasonable allowance for consumer use of the lemon vehicle
is subtracted. The tractor lemon laws do not provide that farmers be compensated for towing

charges or the rental of other equipment while their new tractors are under repair.
The automobile lemon laws provide consumers more rights than are provided by the
tractor laws under the dispute settlement provisions set forth by the laws. First, the dispute
resolution procedure established by the Georgia and Minnesota tractor lemon laws encourages informal settlement of disputes through industry-sponsored programs, whereas a state
5

The Georgia and Minnesota laws require the defect to substantially impair use or market value, but an affirmative defense
would require both to be impaired before a consumer meets the statutory requirements for a refund or replacement.
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program under the automobile lemon laws potentially offers greater consumer relief. As
related by Consumer Reports, state-run arbitration programs have reported consumer
success rates of 48-77%, whereas only 10-30% of consumer actions have been resolved
agreeably under industry-sponsored programs. 6 Second, dispute settlement programs under
tractor lemon laws adopting the federal procedure enable a manufacturer to prevent a
consumer from making an oral presentation (Code of FederalRegulations). Third, automobile consumers may have more rights in appealing unfavorable results. The dispute procedures of the Georgia and Minnesota tractor lemon laws require settlements to be binding,
whereas the automobile laws of these states allow consumer appeals.
A loaned-tractor exception of the tractor lemon laws may negate replacements or refunds
for a defect. The exception declares that if a consumer is provided the use of another farm
tractor which is capable of performing the same functions, the prescribed out-of-service
period is tolled. This allows producers to provide a substitute tractor so that the consumer
would never qualify for a replacement or refund (Centner). For example, if qualification for
relief was to be based on the vehicle being out of service due to repairs for too many days,
the consumer could be loaned another tractor until the statutory term had expired. Thereafter,
any days the tractor was out of service after the statutory term had run would not count for
meeting the out-of-service period. Moreover, a consumer might be loaned a tractor for the
remainder of the statutory term so that the vehicle would not break down enough times for
the consumer to qualify for relief.
Principal-Agent Lemon-Law Model
The economic efficiency of lemon laws may be investigated with a principal-agent model.
To eliminate certain preventable accidents and preclude negative externalities from accruing,
the state acts as an agent for consumers inducing producers of vehicles to reduce the level
of defects. Reducing defects is costly, and in the long-run, the costs are passed on to
consumers. Therefore, the state's objective is to design a warranty law that induces the
producer to take socially efficient action (precaution). In the literature, this is defined as a
principal-agent problem where the state is the principal and the producer is the agent
(Varian). For modeling the lemon-law warranty provisions, the principal-agent problem is
modified so that the principal employs a penalty based on warranty law as opposed to a
payment. Furthermore, the objective of the state is solely to induce a certain action, which
does not include maximizing the extraction of economic surplus from the producer.
Since lemon laws define conformity and specify what is guaranteed, a conforming vehicle
may have a defect. Let xc be the monetary value for a set of defects associated with a
conforming vehicle and x, be the monetary value for a set of vehicle defects where neither
set is observable at time of sale. The four lemon-law prerequisites imply cltactors > Xcautos
with the symbols Itacor and lautos referring to tractor and autos, respectively. Following Varian,

let a and b be possible levels of precaution that can be chosen by a producer out of some set
of feasible actions, A, which influence the probability of occurrence of xc and xn. Let va and
vb be the costs of precautions a and b, respectively, Tcb denote the probability that xc is
observed if the producer chooses precaution b, and let 7 nb = 1 - cb. To provide incentives
In Georgia, an Office of Consumer Affairs offers automobile consumers assistance and a reasonably simple procedure to
assert rights against manufacturers of lemon automobiles, whereas no corresponding assistance is available for tractor
consumers. Within the first 29 months of adoption of the Georgia automobile lemon law, over three thousand consumers
contacted this office (Georgia Office of Consumer Affairs).
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for a producer to take precaution b, the state may levy certain penalties s,.(x,) and s,,(x,,)
associated with x,, and x, , respectively. These penalties may consist of restitution remedies
in lemon laws that outline a producer's duty to establish arbitration mechanisms, repair
vehicles, or take back and replace a vehicle. As addressed above, the different restitution
remedies for automobiles and tractors result in s, ltr,,,a,,
< s latos,. Assuming the state is risk
neutral, the state's expected returns if a producer chooses precaution b is
(1)

(Se.

-X. )

cb + (S,-

XJ)2nth.

Assume a producer is risk averse and has the objective of maximizing a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with precaution costs entering linearly into utility, u. The producer
will choose precaution level b if the following incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied:
(2)

u(sc )

cbh+ (s,, )1 ,, + Vh n• U(Sc )t ca + U(S, )7t na + Va,

and will choose precaution a otherwise (Kreps; Varian). The producer's optimal precaution
level will be determined given the warranty law that the state picks. Although the state is
not able to choose the producer's level of precaution directly, it can influence the producer's
level through warranty law.
The producer's costs, s, s,, and v, are negatively related to utility. A warranty law with

high penalties for producing a defective vehicle can cause the producer to exit the market.
Assume the level of disutility where the producer will not participate is i. The expected
utility from participation must then be
(3)

u(s C )} c ,h + u(s, )n b + Vh < U.

Constraint (3) is called the participation-individual rationality or reservation level of utility
constraint. The producer may have other opportunities available that result in some reservation level of utility. The state may want to ensure the producer receives at least this
reservation level. As discussed in Kreps, this formulation is far from general. A very special
form of a utility function is assumed for the producer and the state is assumed to be risk
neutral. However, the analysis can be extended to encompass more general formulations
(Grossman and Hart).
The state's objective is to maximize (1) subject to constraints (2) and (3). Assume that
precaution level b results from the optimal incentive scheme, s, and s,, determined from
maximum of (1). Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for this maximum can be derived by

differentiating the Lagrangian, resulting in
(4)

.i

- Xu (Si)

ib - PU'(Si)(7ib -ltia)=,

i=candn,

where Rand g are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (3) and (2), respectively. Equation
(4) may be interpreted by dividing by u'(s, ) i,, and rearranging terms

(5)

(5)

= +[

7i
l1i+,1 /,],

i= c andn.
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Suppose uI= 0, the incentive compatibility constraint is nonbinding, then (5) implies that
u'(si) = 1 / X, some constant. Penalty to the producer is independent of the outcome, xi, so

si is equal to some constant s. Substituting s into (2) and noting that probability distributions sum to one, yields
(6)

Va> V,.

This case where g = 0 can only arise when the precaution level that is preferred by the state
is also the low-cost action for the producer. When the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding, [, • 0 , the costs to the producer will vary with the outcome. The state desires a
precaution level that imposes high costs on the producer, so the cost to the producer will
depend on the behavior of the likelihood ratio n ca / cb This likelihood ratio measures the
likelihood of observing xc given that the producer chooses a to the likelihood of observing
x c given that the producer chooses b. A high value of the likelihood ratio is evidence that the
producer chooses a, while a low value indicates the producer chooses b.
Graphical Treatment
Following Varian, it is convenient for graphical treatment to reformulate the problem as one
with linear constraints and a nonlinear objective function. Let ui be the penalty associated

with precaution level xi, u(si) = u1, andf be the inverse of the utility function, si =J(ui),i = c
and n. The largest possible utility that the state receives if it designs a scheme that induces
the producer to choose precaution level b is
(7)

v(b)= max[f(uc)-

c

Uc,U.I

cb + [f(u )-Xn ]Cnb

subject to
(8)

(9)

Ucicb + Un7 nb + Vb < Uc71 ca + Uni na + Va,

cb
uc ,+

Un nb + Vb

and

<

The constraint set determined by (8) and (9) is illustrated in figure 1. A producer choosing

precaution a or b has linear indifference curves:
Ucn cb + Unr nb + Vb = constant, and
Uc ca + Un na + Va =

constant.

The equality of (8) corresponds to the point where the producer's two indifference curves
intersect. Solving for uc at this equality yields
(10)

uc =u, +

Va - Vb
cb -

ca
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Figure 1. Efficient penalties with a nonbinding incentive compatibility constraint

represented as the incentive compatibility constraint in figure 1. At every point on this
incentive compatibility constraint the producer is indifferent between the two precaution

levels a and b. The region where precaution b is preferred by the producer is the region below
the line formed by (10). Below (10) the strict inequality in (8) holds, so the producer will
choose level b. The shaded area represents the area satisfying the two constraints (8) and
(9).

The state's marginal rate of substitution, MRS,, is
MRS, =

f'(u,, )T nb,

The producer's MRSa is
MRS,a

n
Ccb

When the penalties u, and u,, are equal, u = u,,, as illustrated by the 45-degree line in figure
1, the state's and producer's indifference curves are tangent. If the incentive compatibility
constraint is nonbinding, the producer's penalty associated with conformity and nonconformity is constant. It does not vary if the producer conforms or produces a product with a
defect.
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Figure 2. Binding incentive compatibility constraint warranty legislation

If the state exercised its full monopoly power, the state would extract the reservation
value of utility. This represents a lump-sum tax on the producer independent of
whether the producer conforms. For a level of taxation at or below this reservation value,
the producer will always choose the desired precaution level b, because of (6). The producer
will maximize utility where uc = un = 0. At all points on this Pareto efficient cord the level
of nonconformity is the same. Only a shifting of economic surplus between the producer
and the state occurs depending on the magnitude of this tax. Warranty legislation is generally
not used as a lump-sum taxation method. Thus, no warranty legislation would be enacted
and the equilibrium is u,, = u, = 0.

If the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, as illustrated in figure 2, the penalty
to the producer will vary with the outcomes xc and x,. The producer has the option of either,
adopting the lower cost precaution level a, va < vb, and incurring penalty u, when a defect
occurs with probability Tna, or choosing precaution level b and incurring cost b,and penalty
u, with a lower probability 'n,,,. If the state exercises its full monopoly power, point C, u,
and uC are the threshold levels of penalties where the producer is indifferent between
precautions a and b. In contrast, the minimum level of penalties at a threshold level of
disutility is u, associated with u, = 0 in figure 2.
Inducing Precaution
Assuming the state is solely interested in warranty laws to induce producers to employ
precaution b and not as a taxation method, then the equilibrium threshold level is un and
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u,. = 0. If a producer produces a vehicle which conforms to the terms of the warranty law,
no costs for repair or replacement of the vehicle are incurred as a result of the warranty.

Alternatively, if the vehicle does not conform with the warranty law, the producer will incur
an additional cost u,. This provides an incentive for decreasing the probability ofproducing
a defect by employing precaution b. If the state sets u, below this threshold value u>,say
uS,, the disincentive will not be sufficient to induce producer's adoption of desired precaution

b. Alternatively, a level above the threshold value un and still satisfying the participation
constraint, say u,, will induce producer's adoption of precaution b. If the disincentive
becomes so large that the participation constraint is violated, the producer exits the market.

The threshold penalty u, is influenced by the probability of vehicle conformity given
precautions a and b. The ratio n ca / b is 0 < R ca / cb < 1 and as this ratio approaches one,
the threshold u, increases. As the probabilities of producing a conforming vehicle under the
alternative precautions converge, the penalty associated with the producer selecting precaution a must increase in order for the producer to be willing to adopt precaution b. Assuming
the monotone likelihood ratio property from the regularity conditions in the statistics
literature, a relation between na /cb and x, can be established (Kreps; Varian). The
monotone likelihood ratio property requires that Tca /tnT be monotone increasing in x,, which

also results in un monotone increasing in

L.

Considering the levels of conformity for

automobile and tractor lemon laws, as delineated by warranty legislation, automobile lemon
laws generally would induce fewer defects compared with tractor lemon laws. This implies
(11)

xc,,
autos < Xc Itractors

Relatively more tractors conform under the tractor lemon laws, but the level of defects is
higher compared to the automobile lemon laws. Equation (11), given the monotone likeli-

hood ratio property, results in
7

ca |

ca
Itractorsv,

autos
cbh

cb

which implies ul,,tos < U Itractors . The current lemon laws for automobiles and tractors are
not consistent with this result. Under current laws, the level of penalty u, is reversed; the

tractor lemon laws require fewer remedies than automobile laws. As conformity standards
weaken, a shift from automobile to tractor lemon laws, the threshold level of penalties for
not taking the state's preferred level of precaution should increase. Instead the penalties
decrease, penalties under tractor lemon laws are less severe compared with automobile
lemon laws.
This inconsistency of the laws with economic efficiency suggests two possible scenarios.
First, the definition of a defect under automobile laws may be too strong in terms of
increasing the probability of a defect, compared with the level of penalties for defects. In
the alternative, the definition of a defect in tractor laws may be too weak relative to its
associated penalties. Smithson and Thomas provide evidence as an aid in determining the
likelihood of one scenario over the other. As an explanation for why consumers place a low
value on lemon laws, Smithson and Thomas note that the new arbitration mechanisms used
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by automobile producers reduce the probability of consumers taking actions under lemon
laws. This implies that the penalty u, associated with the automobile lemon laws is equal to
or greater than the threshold u,Ia,,.o Assuming automobile lemon laws played a role in this
upgrading, the laws had the desired effect of inducing producers to adopt precaution levels
that significantly decreased the probability of a defect, precaution b.
Tractor lemon laws are relatively new, so no corresponding evidence as associated with
automobile laws is available. However, given relative higher likelihood ratios and lower u,
associated with tractors, tractor producers do not have as strong an incentive to adopt the
preferred precaution b. Thus, the probability of being below the threshold

Itracrs

is

significantly enhanced. If state legislators desire tractor producers to adopt similar precautions as automobile producers, consideration of changing the definition of defects and
increasing the penalties associated with defects at or near levels associated with automobile
lemon laws may be required.
Conclusion
In a broad context of overall resource allocation, when a Coasian solution is not practical
due to market imperfections, some form of governmental intervention may improve social
welfare. Assuming governmental intervention in the form of lemon laws may improve social
welfare, the level of nonconformity and associated penalties should be considered. For
economic efficiency, a strong conformity law embracing specific obligations can be coupled
with relatively few penalties in the form of remedies. As the definition of conformity is
weakened and obligations decrease, remedies associated with defects should increase. As
evidenced by the current lemon laws for automobiles and tractors, this economically efficient
relation between obligations and remedies does not always exist. In particular, given the
inconsistent weak conformity definition for tractors associated with relatively few remedies

for defects, the probability of current tractor lemon laws providing sufficient inducement
for efficient producer precaution is questionable.
[Received September 1994;final version received March 1995.]
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